Juvenile Life Without Parole in North Carolina by Finholt, Ben et al.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 
Volume 110 
Issue 2 Spring Article 2 
Spring 2020 
Juvenile Life Without Parole in North Carolina 
Ben Finholt 
Brandon L. Garrett 
Karima Modjadidi 
Kristen M. Renberg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ben Finholt, Brandon L. Garrett, Karima Modjadidi, and Kristen M. Renberg, Juvenile Life Without Parole in 
North Carolina, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 141 (2020). 
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc/vol110/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of 
Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons. 
0091-4169/20/11002-0141 
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 110, No. 2 
Copyright © 2020 by Ben Finholt, Brandon L. Garrett, Karima Modjadidi, & Kristen M. Renberg Printed in U.S.A. 
141 
JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE IN 
NORTH CAROLINA 
BEN FINHOLT, BRANDON L. GARRETT, KARIMA 
MODJADIDI, & KRISTEN M. RENBERG* 
Life without parole (LWOP) is “an especially harsh punishment for a 
juvenile,” as the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Graham v. Florida.  The United 
States is the only country in the world that imposes juvenile life without 
parole (JLWOP) sentences.  Many of these individuals were sentenced 
during a surge in LWOP sentencing in the 1990s.  In the past decade, 
following several Supreme Court rulings eliminating mandatory sentences of 
LWOP for juvenile offenders, such sentencing has declined.  This Article 
aims to empirically assess the rise and then the fall in JLWOP sentencing in 
a leading sentencing state, North Carolina, to better understand these trends 
and their implications. 
We examine the cases of ninety-four North Carolina juveniles, aged 
thirteen to seventeen at the time of their offenses, who were sentenced to 
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JLWOP.1  Of those, forty-nine are currently serving LWOP sentences.  In 
North Carolina, JLWOP sentencing has markedly declined.  Since 2011, 
there have been only five of such sentences.  Of the group of ninety-four 
juvenile offenders, forty-four have so far been resentenced to non-LWOP 
sentences—largely pursuant to the post-Miller v. Alabama legislation passed 
in North Carolina.  These JLWOP sentences are primarily concentrated in a 
small group of counties.  A total of 61% (fifty-seven of the ninety-four) 
JLWOP sentences in North Carolina were entered in one of the eleven 
counties that have imposed more than three JLWOP sentences.  We find a 
path dependency to these sentences: once a county has imposed a JLWOP 
sentence, it has a higher probability of imposing a JLWOP sentence again in 
the future.  In contrast, homicide rates are not predictive of JLWOP 
sentences.  We question what goals JLWOP serves, given what an 
inconsistently used, uncommon, geographically limited, and costly sentence 
it has been in practice.  In conclusion, we describe alternatives to JLWOP, 
including the model adopted in states such as California and Wyoming, in 
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INTRODUCTION 
Life without parole is “an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile,” 
as the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Graham v. Florida.2  Ruling on the 
Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment, the Court 
emphasized that “a 16-year-old and a 75-year-old each sentenced to life 
without parole receive the same punishment in name only.”3  Indeed, the 
United States is the only country in the world that imposes juvenile life 
without parole sentences; such sentences are banned in every other country 
and prohibited by human rights treaties.4  In the United States, there are over 
two thousand people still serving life without parole (LWOP) sentences for 
homicides they committed as juveniles.5  Many of these individuals were 
sentenced during a surge in LWOP sentencing in the 1990s.6  In the past 
decade, however, following several Supreme Court rulings which culminated 
in finding mandatory sentences of LWOP for juvenile offenders 
unconstitutional, juvenile LWOP (JLWOP) sentencing has declined.7  
Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia currently do not permit 
LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders.8  Additionally, many states have 
established methods for periodic review of sentences for persons who had 
 
 2 560 U.S. 48, 70 (2010). 
 3 Id. 
 4 Tera Agyepong, Children Left Behind Bars: Sullivan, Graham, and Juvenile Life 
Without Parole Sentences, 9 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 83, 84 (2010); Connie de la Vega & 
Michelle Leighton, Sentencing Our Children to Die in Prison: Global Law and Practice, 42 
U.S.F. L. REV. 983, 989 (2008) (describing that at least 135 countries have rejected JLWOP 
sentences). All countries except the U.S. have ratified Article 37(a) of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 5 JOSH ROVNER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AN 
OVERVIEW 1 (2019). 
 6 See infra Part I.A. 
 7 Id. 
 8 ROVNER, supra note 5, at 1. 
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been sentenced to LWOP for juvenile offenses.9  This Article aims to 
empirically assess the rise and then the fall in JLWOP sentencing in a leading 
sentencing state, North Carolina, to better understand these trends and their 
implications.10 
The sentence of LWOP was authorized in only seven states prior to 
1971.11  The use of LWOP rose as the viability of the death penalty was 
threatened in the mid-1970s,12 but the sentence did not become ubiquitous 
until the 1990s.13  The federal government and many states enacted new 
statutes limiting or eliminating parole during this time period.14  In the middle 
of the 1990s, state and federal lawmakers became concerned with a 
perception that juvenile “superpredators” were disproportionately 
responsible for serious crimes, and they adopted a range of measures to try 
more juveniles in adult criminal courts.15  As a result, states enacted statutes 
 
 9 Id. 
 10 Two prior studies have examined numbers of persons serving JLWOP sentences in the 
United States and documenting race and geographic disparities. JOHN R. MILLS ET AL., THE 
PHILLIPS BLACK PROJECT, NO HOPE: RE-EXAMINING LIFETIME SENTENCES FOR JUVENILE 
OFFENDERS (2015), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55bd511ce4b0830374d25948/t/5
600cc20e4b0f36b5caabe8a/1442892832535/JLWOP+2.pdf [https://perma.cc/PR7U-4R9F]; 
John Mills et al., Juvenile Life without Parole in Law and Practice: Chronicling the Rapid 
Change Underway, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 535 (2016). One prior state-level study examined 
JLWOP sentences in Michigan. DEBORAH LABELLE ET AL., ACLU OF MICH., SECOND 
CHANCES: JUVENILES SERVING LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE IN MICHIGAN PRISONS (2004), http://
www.aclumich.org/sites/default/files/file/Publications/Juv%20Lifers%20V8.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/E2ZL-36DT]. A second state-level study has examined Florida data. PAOLO G. ANNINO 
ET AL., JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NON-HOMICIDE OFFENSES: FLORIDA COMPARED 
TO NATION (2009). 
 11 ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LIFE GOES ON: THE HISTORIC RISE IN LIFE 
SENTENCES IN AMERICA 29 (2013), https://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/
Life-Goes-On.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7YX-2JBQ] [hereinafter NELLIS, LIFE GOES ON]; 
ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, STILL LIFE: AMERICA’S INCREASING USE OF LIFE 
AND LONG-TERM SENTENCES (2017) [hereinafter NELLIS, STILL LIFE]. See LIFE WITHOUT 
PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY? (Charles J. Ogletree Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 
2012), for a collection of perspectival essays on the rise of life without parole sentencing. 
 12 See BRANDON L. GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE: HOW KILLING THE DEATH PENALTY CAN 
REVIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 25–26 (2017) (describing Furman v. Georgia and state legislative 
responses to Supreme Court decisions regarding the death penalty in the 1970s). 
 13 NELLIS, STILL LIFE, supra note 11, at 7 fig. 1. 
 14 See GARRETT, supra note 12, at 95–96 (describing increasing adoption of life without 
parole statutes, with thirty-three states having done so by 1990 and most of the rest having 
done so by 2012). 
 15 Regarding the public outcry concerning supposed juvenile “superpredators,” see, e.g., 
David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, “Owing to the Extreme Youth of the Accused”: The 
Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 642–43 
(2002) (describing how “[s]tate and local prosecutors and crime conservatives jumped on the 
‘superpredator’ bandwagon, adopting the rhetoric in a full-scale assault on the legitimacy of 
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permitting—and prosecutors increasingly sought—LWOP sentences for 
juveniles.16  A small subset of states have long accounted for the vast majority 
of those JLWOP sentences; nine states have accounted for more than 80% of 
such sentences.17  What is less understood is whether county-level patterns 
and local behaviors within states drive JLWOP sentencing. 
In this Article, we examine JLWOP sentencing in North Carolina in 
order to better understand the patterns in sentencing and the costs of such 
sentences.  We focus on North Carolina as a case study because, as we 
describe in Part I, North Carolina is one of the nine states that have imposed 
the majority of JLWOP sentences in the U.S.  Further, North Carolina 
continues to retain LWOP for juvenile offenders.18  While LWOP is no 
longer mandatory as a result of 2012 legislation enacted following the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Miller v. Alabama, the lower-age-limit for 
sentencing an individual to LWOP for homicide in North Carolina is thirteen 
years old.19  We describe the protracted litigation that can result from the 
appeals taken in these cases and the reversals, including in cases in which the 
defendant was not the shooter or where substantial mitigating evidence was 
presented on appeal.  One striking figure is that over one third of the juveniles 
sentenced to LWOP, thirty-two individuals, were convicted under a felony 
murder theory.20  For example, in the case of State v. Seam, a sixteen-year-
old defendant rejected a plea.  He was not the shooter, and the prosecution 
 
the juvenile court”); Elizabeth Becker, As Ex-Theorist on Young ‘Superpredators,’ Bush Aide 
Has Regrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at A19. During this time period, most states also 
increased numbers of children tried as adults and housed in adult prisons. See AMNESTY INT’L, 
BETRAYING THE YOUNG: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST CHILDREN IN THE US JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 12 (1998). 
 16 MILLS ET AL., supra note 10, at 9 (“The overwhelming majority of JLWOP sentences 
being served today were handed down during the 1990’s when a moral panic about violent 
youth led to a dramatic rise in harsh sentencing practices against juveniles, including 
expanding the use of JLWOP.”). 
 17 Id. at 6 fig. 2. Those states are California, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. 
 18 We note that, partially in response to these findings, lawmakers in North Carolina are 
currently considering H.B. 775, Gen. Assemb., 2019 Sess. (N.C. 2019) 775, which would be 
entitled, “An Act to Eliminate Life Without Parole for Juveniles and to Modify Parole 
Eligibility for Juveniles Sentenced to More than Fifteen Years Imprisonment.” For coverage 
of this study, when first released as a report in early 2019, see, e.g., Virginia Bridges, Dozens 
of NC Juvenile Offenders Are Serving Life Terms in Prison. Should They Get Another 
Chance?, NEWS & OBSERVER, Feb. 11, 2019, https://www.newsobserver.com/news/state/nort
h-carolina/article226082615.html [https://perma.cc/2833-538T]; Amanda Magnus & Frank 
Stasio, Legal Experts Say Life Without Parole Should End for Juveniles, N.C. PUB. RADIO, 
Feb. 19, 2019. 
 19 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7B-2200, 15A-1340.19A (2019); 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
 20 See infra Figures A and B. 
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theory was felony murder.21  After trial, the judge sentenced him to JLWOP, 
unlike the actual killer, who took a plea.22  Post-Miller, the lower-court judge 
readily concluded that Seam should have his sentenced reduced, but two sets 
of hearings and three rounds of appeals ensued before the sentence was 
finally reduced to life with the possibility for parole.23 
In Part II of this Article, we examine the cases of the ninety-four 
juveniles in North Carolina who were sentenced to JLWOP from 1994 to 
present.24  Their ages at the time of the offense ranged from thirteen to 
seventeen.  Of those, forty-eight are currently serving LWOP sentences (one 
more currently has a new trial pending).25  These cases are detailed in 
Appendix A.  Of those juvenile offenders, forty-five have so far been 
resentenced to non-LWOP sentences, largely pursuant to the post-Miller 
legislation in North Carolina.26  We analyze these cases using several 
methods: we provide detailed descriptive information about these JLWOP 
cases, we analyze trends in sentencing and litigation, and we undertake 
regression analyses of county-level patterns.  First, we describe how JLWOP 
sentencing has declined in North Carolina markedly since its highwater mark 
in the late 1990s; beginning in 2011, there have been either one or no such 
sentences each year.  Second, we describe how these JLWOP sentences were 
highly concentrated in a handful of counties.  Such county-level research has 
been conducted regarding death sentences in the United States, but not 
regarding LWOP sentencing.27  Third, we describe the race of defendants 
sentenced to JLWOP, and how it correlates with the demographics of all 
 
 21 See infra Part I.E. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 See infra Appendix A (listing all ninety-four such cases). These cases were identified 
from North Carolina Department of Corrections and Department of Public Safety records. 
 25 In contrast, 203 offenders sentenced for crimes committed when seventeen or younger 
are serving life with parole sentences and sixty-three are serving terms of over forty years. 
North Carolina Department of Public Safety, Life and 40+ Year Sentences For Those 
Sentenced When 17 or Younger, SR1901-02, Nov. 14, 2018 (on file with author). Terms of 
over forty years may often consist in de facto or virtual life without parole sentences, given 
prison life expectancies, if they are not reconsidered prior to the end of the term. 
 26 However, of these forty-one, two will not be eligible for parole for fifty years and 
another is not eligible for sixty-three years. 
 27 See generally GARRETT, supra note 12 (presenting statistical analysis of death 
sentencing from 1973 to 2016); Brandon L. Garrett et al., The American Death Penalty 
Decline, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 561 (2017); James S. Liebman & Peter Clarke, 
Minority Practice, Majority’s Burden: The Death Penalty Today, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 
299 (2011); Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and Its Ramifications, 92 
B.U. L. REV. 227, 265–75 (2012) (examining county-level death sentencing from 2004 to 
2009). 
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juvenile homicide offenders in North Carolina.  Fourth, we examine the 
procedural posture of pending cases that still await resentencing hearings 
under the post-Miller legislation.  It is likely that many more of the remaining 
forty-four cases will result in non-LWOP sentences.  Fifth, we employ a set 
of statistical analyses to explore the existence of an “inertia effect,” to 
understand if the institutional memory of past JLWOP sentences predicts 
future JLWOP sentences. 
In Part III, we conclude by examining the costs of continued use of 
JLWOP based on the evidence described in this Article, and by making 
estimates of future costs.  We note the lack of recent or ongoing JLWOP 
sentencing, and the estimated cost of the hearings and litigation required by 
past JLWOP sentences.  Millions of dollars are being spent on years of 
hearings and appeals—including in cases that are obviously not fit for such 
severe sentences, such as cases in which the defendant was not the shooter or 
presented substantial mitigating evidence.  We ask whether it makes practical 
sense to retain JLWOP going forward, given what an unusual, geographically 
limited, and costly sentence it has become.  In conclusion, we describe 
alternatives to the JLWOP regime of North Carolina, including the models 
adopted in states such as California, Virginia, and Wyoming—in which there 
is periodic review of lengthy sentences imposed on juvenile offenders.  We 
also describe how more reasonable prosecution approaches, short of the 
enactment of new legislation, could address the defects in the current 
approach towards juvenile life without parole. 
I. THE NORTH CAROLINA ADOPTION OF LWOP AND JLWOP 
A. NORTH CAROLINA’S ADOPTION OF JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT 
PAROLE 
North Carolina originally adopted LWOP for adults and for juveniles in 
1994 as part of the change from the prior sentencing scheme, termed “Fair 
Sentencing,” to a new scheme termed “Structured Sentencing.”28  The new 
statute eliminated parole and defined all life sentences as “natural life” 
sentences with no possibility for parole.29  The following year, the legislature 
 
 28 For four years, until the provision was repealed in 1998, the North Carolina statute also 
provided a safety valve in the form of judicial review of LWOP sentences after twenty-five 
years of imprisonment; sentences entered during that window will be eligible for review 
beginning in 2019. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1380.5 (repealed 1998). For a detailed analysis of 
that process, which has not yet resulted in any reviews, see James Markham, Twenty-Five Year 
Review of Sentences to Life Without Parole, North Carolina Criminal Law Blog (May 19, 
2016, 1:43 PM), https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/twenty-five-year-review-sentences-life-w
ithout-parole/ [https://perma.cc/7STY-JFPD]. 
 29 H.R. 27, 1994 Gen. Assemb., Extra Sess. (N.C. 1994). 
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also lowered the age for the transfer of juveniles to adult court for non-
homicide offenses to the age of thirteen.30  By taking these steps, North 
Carolina joined almost every state in adopting harsher and more adult 
punishments for juveniles in the mid-1990s.31 
The JLWOP statute was constitutionally challenged, including under 
the Eighth Amendment, and affirmed by the North Carolina Supreme Court.  
In its 1998 decision, State v. Green, the court held that JLWOP sentences 
under the Structured Sentencing statute were constitutional and a 
“reasonable” legislative response to crime rates.32  The court also concluded 
that the crime in the case, committed by a thirteen-year-old, was “not the type 
attributable to or characteristic of a ‘child.’”33 
B. ADOLESCENT BRAIN SCIENCE AND U.S. SUPREME COURT 
RULINGS 
While criminal laws have traditionally made sharp distinctions between 
the treatment of juvenile and adult offenders, a growing body of scientific 
research regarding adolescent brain development has established that 
development progresses well into a person’s twenties and does not conclude 
when a person turns eighteen.  Studies of human brain development have 
found that adolescents do not possess well-formed characters and are still 
 
 30 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-608 (1997); see also State v. Green, 477 S.E.2d 182, 187–88 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1996), aff’d, 502 S.E.2d 819 (N.C. 1998). 
 31 Patricia Torbet & Linda Szymanski, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, State Legislative Responses 
to Violent Juvenile Crime: 1996-97 Update, 6–9 (1998), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/1728
35.pdf. [https://perma.cc/V2FX-UUUH]; see also Sara Sun Beale, You’ve Come a Long Way, 
Baby: Two Waves of Juvenile Justice Reforms as Seen from Jena, Louisiana, 44 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 511, 514 (2009). Regarding the myth of the juvenile “superpredator” at that time, 
see, e.g., Jane Rutherford, Juvenile Justice Caught Between The Exorcist and A Clockwork 
Orange, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 715, 720–21 (2002); John Dilulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-
-Predators, THE WASH. EXAM’R (Nov. 27, 1995), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/we
ekly-standard/the-coming-of-the-super-predators [https://perma.cc/24A5-T2EH]; Equal Just. 
Initiative, The Superpredator Myth, 20 Years Later (Apr. 7, 2014), https://eji.org/news/super
predator-myth-20-years-later [https://perma.cc/H98Z-Z945]. 
 32 State v. Green, 502 S.E.2d 819, 832 (N.C. 1998). 
 33 Id. 
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developing the ability to make well-reasoned decisions.34  Juveniles are more 
susceptible to impulse and to outside influences.35 
The U.S. Supreme Court emphasized this research in its 2005 ruling in 
Roper v. Simmons, finding that the Eighth Amendment barred the imposition 
of the death penalty on persons who were juveniles at the time of the 
offense.36  The American Medical Association (AMA) filed an amicus brief 
in the case, arguing that “[a]dolescents’ behavioral immaturity mirrors the 
anatomical immaturity of their brains,” and the American Psychological 
Association (APA) similarly filed a neuroscience brief.37  The Court noted, 
and cited to amici for the proposition, that juveniles have a “lack of maturity” 
and an “underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” which “often results in 
impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”38  Juveniles also lack 
foresight and often cannot be deterred by criminal punishments, since they 
are “less likely to take a possible punishment into consideration when making 
decisions.”39 
 
 34 See generally ELKHONON GOLDBERG, THE EXECUTIVE BRAIN: FRONTAL LOBES AND THE 
CIVILIZED MIND (2001); PETER R. HUTTENLOCHER, NEURAL PLASTICITY: THE EFFECTS OF 
ENVIRONMENT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CEREBRAL CORTEX (2002); M. MARSEL 
MESULAM, Behavioral Neuroanatomy, in PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIORAL AND COGNITIVE 
NEUROLOGY 1 (M. Marsel Mesulam ed., 2d ed. 2000); Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping 
of Human Cortical Development During Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8174 (2004); Kenneth K. Kwong et al., Dynamic Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging of Human Brain Activity During Primary Sensory Stimulation, 89 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. 5675 (1992). 
 35 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477 (2012) (citing to “immaturity, impetuosity, and 
failure to appreciate risks and consequences”). 
 36 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005). 
 37 Brief of the American Medical Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent 
at 10, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1633549; Brief for the 
American Psychological Ass’n and the Missouri Psychological Ass’n as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondent at 9–12, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 
WL 1636447. 
 38 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. 
 39 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72 (2010); For detailed critical discussion of the Roper 
ruling, see, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, The Scientific Shortcomings of Roper v. Simmons, 3 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 379 (2006); Elizabeth F. Emens, Aggravating Youth: Roper v. Simmons 
and Age Discrimination, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 51 (2005); Aliya Haider, Roper v. Simmons: The 
Role of the Science Brief, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 369 (2006); Terry A. Maroney, The False 
Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89, 176 
(2009); Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A 
Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 408 (2006) (“Roper has been the most important 
case to propose use of the new neuroscience to affect responsibility questions generally.”). 
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These features of adolescent brain development impact the accuracy, as 
well as the fairness, of juvenile convictions and sentences.40  Juveniles are 
more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures.41  
They may face greater difficulty working with counsel and understanding the 
consequences of interrogations or legal choices and proceedings.42  This 
suggestibility also makes juveniles particularly vulnerable to wrongful 
conviction, because they are more likely to falsely confess during police 
questioning.43  Studies have found that juveniles are disproportionately 
represented among exonerations—specifically, exonerations that resulted 
from false confessions—meaning they are more often wrongfully 
convicted.44  For these reasons, in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Court noted 
that “time and time again” the Justices have “observed that children generally 
are less mature and responsible than adults, that they often lack the 
experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that 
could be detrimental to them, that they are more vulnerable or susceptible to 
. . . outside pressures than adults, and so on.”45 
Rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court interpreting the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment have impacted juvenile 
sentencing in North Carolina, as in other death penalty and JLWOP states.  
In Roper v. Simmons, as noted, the Court found juvenile death sentences 
unconstitutional.46  Following that ruling, three juveniles in North Carolina—
all seventeen years old at the time of the offense—that had been sentenced to 
 
 40 Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: 
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009 (2003). 
 41 Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. 
 42 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477–78 (2012) (“inability to deal with police officers 
or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys”) 
(citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 78 (“[T]he features that distinguish juveniles from adults also put 
them at a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings[.]”)). 
 43 For example, in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 48 (1967), the Supreme Court noted that “[w]ith 
respect to juveniles, both common observation and expert opinion emphasize that the ‘distrust 
of confessions made in certain situations’ . . . is imperative in the case of children from an 
early age through adolescence.” 
 44 SAMUEL GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, EXONERATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989–
2012: REPORT BY THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS 60 (2012) (finding that 42% of 
exonerated defendants younger than eighteen at the time of the crime had confessed); Brandon 
L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1094 (2010) (finding 
that one-third of DNA exonerations who had falsely confessed were juveniles); Brandon L. 
Garrett, Confession Contamination Revisited, 101 VA. L. REV. 395 (2015) (updating analysis). 
 45 564 U.S. 261, 272 (2011) (citations omitted). 
 46 543 U.S. at 555–79. 
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death received resentencing following the Roper ruling that capital 
punishment could not be imposed on juvenile offenders.47 
In 2010, Graham v. Florida found juvenile life without parole sentences 
for non-homicide offenses unconstitutional.48  Again, the American Medical 
Association and American Psychological Association filed neuroscience-
based briefs explaining adolescent brain development.49  That ruling, 
however, did not impact North Carolina, as no such sentences had been 
entered in the state.  Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Miller v. 
Alabama forbade mandatory life without parole sentences for juvenile 
homicide offenses and mandated that sentencing judges consider such 
offenders’ “youth and attendant characteristics” before imposing “the 
harshest possible penalty” for juveniles.50 
C. THE NORTH CAROLINA “MILLER FIX” 
Within weeks of the Miller ruling,51 North Carolina lawmakers 
responded by passing a new statute requiring the sentencing court to consider 
 
 47 North Carolina had permitted juvenile offenders to be sentenced to death. See N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 14–17 (2003). The three such offenders are LaMorris Chapman, Kevin Golphin and 
Fransisco Tirado. See infra Appendix A. On the broader impact of Roper, see Barry C. Feld, 
A Slower Form of Death: Implications of Roper v. Simmons for Juveniles Sentenced to Life 
Without Parole, 22 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 9, 12–13 (2008). For work after 
Roper asking whether it would impact JLWOP see Barry C. Feld, Unmitigated Punishment: 
Adolescent Criminal Responsibility and LWOP Sentences, 10 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 11, 43–70 
(2007); Hillary J. Massey, Disposing of Children: The Eighth Amendment and Juvenile Life 
without Parole after Roper, 47 B.C. L. REV. 1083, 1084, 1091–98 (2006); Brianne Ogilvie, 
Note, Is Life Unfair? What’s Next for Juveniles after Roper v. Simmons, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 
293, 307, 313–14 (2008). 
 48 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010). 
 49 Brief for the American Medical Ass’n and the American Academy of Child and 
Adolescent Psychiatry as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Graham, v. Florida, 560 
U.S. 48 (2010) (No. 08-7412), 2009 WL 2247127; Brief for the American Psychological Ass’n 
et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Graham, v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (No. 
08-7412), 2009 WL 2236778. 
 50 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 469, 479, 483, 489 (2012). 
 51 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1340.19A–19D (2019). The statute was titled, “An act to 
amend the state sentencing laws to comply with the United States Supreme Court Decision in 
Miller v. Alabama.” 2012 N.C. Sess. Law 713–14. The prior statute made LWOP sentences 
mandatory. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14–17 (2009) (providing that “any person who commits 
[murder in the first degree] shall be punished with death or imprisonment in the State’s prison 
for life without parole as the court shall determine pursuant to [N.C.] G.S. [§ ] 15A-2000, 
except that any such person who was under eighteen years of age at the time of the murder 
shall be punished with imprisonment in the State’s prison for life without parole”); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 15A-1340.19B(a) (2013) (“If the sole basis for conviction of a count or each count of 
first degree murder was the felony murder rule, then the court shall sentence the defendant to 
life imprisonment with parole.”). 
152 FINHOLT, GARRETT, MODJADIDI, & RENBERG [Vol. 110 
“all the circumstances of the offense” as well as the “particular circumstances 
of the defendant” and “any mitigating evidence.”52  The North Carolina 
Supreme Court, in interpreting the statute for the first time, ruled that it 
creates no presumption in favor of LWOP.53  However, the court also held 
that factfinders should select a sentence “in light of the United States 
Supreme Court’s statements in Miller and its progeny [that LWOP sentences] 
should be reserved for those juvenile defendants whose crimes reflect 
irreparable corruption rather than transient immaturity.”54  In addition, 
lawmakers in 2013 removed JLWOP for felony murder.55 
D. POST-MILLER LITIGATION 
Post-Miller, as we will detail in Part III, some defendants have been 
sentenced to a term of years or a life with parole sentence, while others have 
been resentenced again to LWOP, and the rest are in the process of being 
resentenced.56  Most recently, in State v. Williams, the North Carolina Court 
of Appeals highlighted again that under Miller, life without parole is 
“reserved for those juvenile defendants who exhibit such irretrievable 
depravity that rehabilitation is impossible.”57  Montrez Williams was 
seventeen when he fatally shot two individuals in Mecklenburg County.  He 
was convicted and sentenced to JLWOP in 2011.58  The Court of Appeals 
reversed the trial court, noted that the trial judge had not found him 
irredeemable, and concluded, “There is no certain prognosis of Defendant[’]s 
possibility of rehabilitation.  The speculation of Defendant’s ability to be 
 
 52 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1340.19B, 15A-1340.19C (2019). The mitigating factors to be 
considered in sentencing include: (1) the offender’s age at the time of offense; (2) immaturity; 
(3) ability to appreciate the risks and consequences of the conduct; (4) intellectual capacity; 
(5) prior record; (6) mental health; (7) familial or peer pressure exerted upon him; (8) 
likelihood that he would benefit from rehabilitation in confinement; and (9) other mitigating 
factors and circumstances. § 15A-1340.19B. 
 53 State v. James, 813 S.E.2d 195, 207 (N.C. 2018). 
 54 Id. 
 55 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14–17(a), 15A-1340.19B (2013) (“If the sole basis for conviction 
of a count or each count of first-degree murder was the felony murder rule, then the court shall 
sentence the defendant to life imprisonment with parole.”). 
 56 See, e.g., James, 813 S.E.2d at 195 (remanding for further resentencing proceedings). 
For another case in process, see State v. Sims, 818 S.E.2d 401 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018), cert. 
granted, 820 S.E.2d 809 (N.C. 2018). The North Carolina Court of Appeals recently rejected 
a challenge to a pre-Miller-fix JLWOP sentence based on a felony murder theory of first-
degree homicide. State v. Seam, 823 S.E.2d 605 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018). 
 57 State v. Williams, 820 S.E.2d 521 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018). For a case in which the Court 
of Appeals upheld LWOP at resentencing under the post-Miller statute, see Sims, 818 S.E.2d 
at 401. 
 58 Williams, 820 S.E.2d at 522. 
2020]  JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE IN NORTH CAROLINA 153 
rehabilitated can only be given minimal weight as a mitigating factor.”59  The 
ruling in Williams cemented the serious weight that must be given to 
mitigating evidence during review of JLWOP sentences in North Carolina. 
Derrick McRae’s case provides another example in which litigation of 
mitigation evidence resulted in a reversal.  Before McRae’s trial, when he 
was tried for first degree murder as a sixteen-year-old, the prosecutors 
offered him a plea deal for which he would serve a sentence of eight to ten 
years.  McRae rejected the deal, against the advice of his counsel.60  The jury 
was hung with eight favoring acquittal.  There was no physical evidence 
linking McRae to the crime, and the eyewitness accounts of the murder were 
mixed.61  The prosecutor then offered McRae a voluntary manslaughter 
sentence, which would require at most only thirteen more months in prison—
a plea which McRae again refused, contending his innocence.62  At the 
second trial, the evidence largely consisted of the testimony of a co-defendant 
and a jailhouse informant.63  Meanwhile, McRae had an unsympathetic 
demeanor during the trial, which the prosecutor commented on in closing 
argument, noting that McRae was “uncaring, unfeeling, not paying attention 
and unremorseful.”64  McRae had schizophrenia at the time of the crime as 
well as the trial, and he did not receive his monthly Haldol injection to treat 
the symptoms before the trial.65  McRae was convicted at the second trial and 
sentenced to LWOP in 1998.66 
In 2017, the Superior Court reversed the JLWOP sentence imposed on 
McRae, citing to a range of mitigating evidence.67  First, the Court did not 
believe that the defendant was “irreparably corrupt or permanently 
incorrigible.”68  One factor was the defendant’s age at the time of the crime 
(sixteen years and seven months).69  As experts testified at the hearing, 
adolescent brains are not developed to weigh consequences, appreciate risks 
 
 59 Id. 
 60 John H. Tucker, Did a Prosecutor and Police Send an Innocent Teenager to Prison for 
Murder? INDY WK., Jan. 7, 2015, https://indyweek.com/news/prosecutor-police-send-innoce
nt-teenager-prison-murder/ [https://perma.cc/9UQB-L63T]. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing on Motion for Appropriate Relief at 424, State v. 
McRae, No. 96 CRS 1576, 2015 N.C. Super. LEXIS 486, at *1 (Sup. Ct. Richmond Cty. Feb. 
4, 2015). 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
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and benefits, or resist impulsive behavior.70  Specifically, an expert clinical 
psychologist testified as to how adolescent brains are structurally and 
chemically different from adult brains, making them more sensitive to 
dopamine and more likely to engage in riskier behavior.71  The court focused 
on the mitigating factors of the defendant’s immaturity, “attributable first to 
his brain not having been fully developed at this point,” “the onset of 
schizophrenia,” and “a very poor home environment.”72  All adolescents are 
too immature to be evaluated as adults, and McCrae’s immaturity was 
exacerbated by the early stages of schizophrenia and a poor home 
environment with a lack of parental guidance or control.73  The judge also 
discussed the inability of the defendant to appreciate risks and the 
consequences of his actions.  The judge found the defendant to be “more 
impaired than most adolescents at that age as a result of his level of cognitive 
ability, his limited exposure to positive influences during his childhood, and 
the emerging psychotic symptoms associated with his schizophrenia.”74  
These symptoms were present at the time of the crime.75  In addition, 
McRae’s intellectual capacity was also considered as a mitigating factor, as 
he had two IQ tests scores of 76 and 77.76  Lastly, the defendant’s behavior 
in prison, with very little aggressive behavior during his twenty years of 
incarceration, and progress in treating schizophrenia, informed the Superior 
Court judge’s finding that he posed a low risk of reoffending.77  Due to these 
factors, the defendant was resentenced to life with a possibility of parole, 
with parole eligibility beginning in 2021.78 
E. FELONY MURDER AND STATE V. SEAM 
JLWOP cases have resulted in protracted litigation, including numerous 
trial court hearings and multiple rounds of appeals.  For an example, take the 
case of Sethy Seam, who was sentenced in North Carolina in 1999 to LWOP 
for a murder and attempted robbery committed when he was sixteen.79  He 
 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 426. 
 75 Christine S. Carroll, Judge Grants Possibility of Parole, Daily Journal (Richmond 
County), Sept. 28, 2017, https://www.yourdailyjournal.com/news/76046/judge-grants-possib
ility-of-parole [https://perma.cc/2R7X-CYPY]. 
 76 Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing on Motion for Appropriate Relief at 426, State v. 
McRae, No. 96 CRS 1576. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 428–29. 
 79 State v. Seam, 552 S.E.2d 708 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). 
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was not the shooter; the prosecution sought this charge under a felony murder 
theory.80  This was surprisingly common in North Carolina JLWOP cases.  
Just over one third of the juveniles sentenced to LWOP, thirty-two 
individuals, were convicted under a felony murder theory.81  The State 
presented evidence that Seam and his friend, Freddie Van, went into a 
Superette convenience store in Lexington, North Carolina.82  The State 
further presented evidence that it was Van who pulled out the pistol, 
demanded money, and after a fist-fight ultimately shot the convenience store 
clerk three times; the wounds were fatal.83  Both defendants unsuccessfully 
tried to open the cash register and then fled.84  The State also presented 
evidence that the two discussed not telling anyone what had happened and 
that Seam hid the murder weapon in the woods and helped Van try to sell the 
weapon the next day.85 
In a statement he made to police shortly after the crime, Seam told 
officers that he did not know that his friend had intended to rob or shoot the 
convenience store clerk.86  The State did not present evidence that Seam was 
aware that his friend had a gun prior to entering the store, and the defendant 
contended that he was not aware.87  Indeed, perhaps because he was not the 
shooter, the State had offered Seam a plea deal that would have entailed a 
sentence of eighteen years.88  The co-defendant, who was the shooter, took a 
plea offer and did not receive a life sentence.89  However, Seam turned down 
the plea, and at trial the judge imposed a LWOP sentence.90 
Twelve years later, in 2011, a Superior Court judge granted a hearing in 
the case, following the enactment of the post-Miller legislation in North 
Carolina.91  In 2013, the Superior Court held hearings and determined that 
 
 80 Id. 
 81 See infra Figures 1 & 2. 
 82 State v. Seam, 805 S.E.2d 302, 303 (N.C. 2001). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Witnesses Say Teen Tried to Sell Pistol After, GREENSBORO NEWS AND RECORD, Sept. 
30, 1999, at B2. 
 87 Brief for the State at 15, State v. Seam, 823 S.E.2d 605 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018) (No. 
COA18-202) (describing defendant’s “claims that he did not know his co-defendant had a gun 
and did not know that he planned to rob the convenience store” and responding by stating that 
defendant was “present” in the store when the gun was “pulled”). 
 88 Order, State v. Seam, 97 CRS 21110-21111 (May 5, 2011). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
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Seam’s sentence was not constitutional and ordering a resentencing.92  This 
ruling was appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court, which affirmed in 
a summary opinion in December 2016.93  Also in December 2016, the trial 
judge resentenced Seam to a sentence of 183 to 229 months.94  The judge 
emphasized that Seam was convicted under the felony murder doctrine, 
explaining that “[w]hen compared to an adult murder, a juvenile who did not 
kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability.”95  The judge 
also noted that Seam deserved to be sentenced to a lesser term than the 
“actual killer,” who took a plea offer.96 
The State again appealed—successfully this time—arguing that the 
judge, by deciding the matter before the Supreme Court mandate issued (in 
order to decide the case before he retired), did not yet have jurisdiction.97  A 
second resentencing hearing was held in 2017, and Seam was resentenced to 
life with the possibility of parole.98  This time, the district attorney conceded 
that a non-LWOP sentence was appropriate.99  In 2013, the legislature had 
enacted a statute providing, “If the sole basis for conviction of a count or 
each count of first degree murder was the felony murder rule, then the court 
shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment with parole.”100 
Seam continued to appeal, seeking a term-of-years sentence and arguing 
that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to felony murder convictions 
and to himself.  In this third round of appeals, the Court of Appeals found the 
life with the possibility of parole sentence to be constitutional.101 
The case illustrates the protracted litigation that occurs in post-Miller 
North Carolina, even in the cases in which current substantive law does not 
permit JLWOP sentences.  The Sections that follow detail patterns in JLWOP 
sentencing in North Carolina, as well as rulings in post-Miller litigation 
regarding such sentences. 
 
 92 Order, State v. Seam, 97 CRS 21110-21111 (Aug. 8, 2013). 
 93 State v. Seam, 794 S.E.2d 439 (N.C. 2016). 
 94 Order, State v. Seam, 97 CRS 21110-21111 (Dec. 30, 2016). 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 State v. Seam, 805 S.E.2d 302 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017). 
 98 Order, State v. Seam, 97 CRS 21110-21111 (Oct. 11, 2017). 
 99 Id. 
 100 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.19B(a) (2017). 
 101 State v. Seam, 823 S.E.2d 605 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018). 
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II. ANALYSIS OF NORTH CAROLINA JLWOP SENTENCING DATA, 1994–
2018 
In the Sections that follow, we analyze data collected on JLWOP 
sentences in North Carolina.  Data was obtained from the North Carolina 
Department of Public Safety and compared with data collected by North 
Carolina Prisoner Legal Services.102  We detail the ninety-four cases in which 
juveniles have been sentenced to LWOP to date and analyze: (A) trends in 
such cases over time, (B) data concerning race, (C) data concerning county-
level patterns, (D) the procedural status of these cases, including reversals 
and pending hearings, and (E) a possible inertia effect in counties where 
JLWOP sentencing is observed. 
A. TRENDS IN JLWOP SENTENCING 
About one-third of the juveniles who had been sentenced to LWOP in 
North Carolina, in total thirty persons, were sentenced from 1994 to 1999.  
From 2000 to 2009, fifty-two juvenile offenders were sentenced to LWOP.  
From 2010 to the present, just twelve juvenile offenders were sentenced to 
LWOP.  These data include cases in which there have been post-Miller 
resentencing, and the individual has received a non-LWOP sentence or has 
already been provided a non-LWOP sentence. 
 
Figure 1.  JLWOP Sentences in North Carolina, 1994–2018103 
 
One can readily see how JLWOP sentencing has declined; after 2011, 
there were only five such sentences in North Carolina.  It should be noted 
that these figures do not include cases in which defendants were convicted of 
first-degree homicide pursuant to the 2012 post-Miller legislation and a life 
with parole or term of years sentence was imposed, because the trial judge 
 
 102 See infra Appendix A. 
 103 The 2018 data is current through August 2018 and thus does not include all sentences 
entered in that year. We do not include 2019 data, but there were no JLWOP sentences in 
North Carolina. We have updated all procedural information about these cases through the 
end of 2019. 
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determined under the statute that no LWOP sentence was warranted.  These 
figures also do not capture cases in which prosecutors charged first-degree 
homicide in juvenile cases, but negotiated lesser charges—resulting, for 
example, in second-degree murder pleas by juvenile offenders.104 
That group of cases, in which juveniles received non-LWOP sentences, 
also sheds light on the wide range of outcomes that result when JLWOP 
charges are sought, but not obtained.  There have been thirty-five murder 
prosecutions of juveniles in North Carolina since the Miller ruling.105  Of 
those, twenty-five defendants were white, eight were black, and one Latinx.  
Of those cases, eleven cases were dismissed without leave, and in two more 
a no true bill was returned, when the grand jury did not indict, for a total of 
37% (thirteen of thirty-five) dismissal of the cases.  In two of the cases, 6%, 
there was a plea to first degree murder.  In eleven cases, 31%, there was a 
plea to second degree murder.  The remaining cases involved pleas to 
voluntary manslaughter (five cases) and accomplice to second degree murder 
(one case).  Two cases went to trial and did not result in LWOP sentences; 
one case resulted in a first-degree murder conviction while the other resulted 
in a manslaughter conviction.  Just three of these thirty-five cases resulted in 
first degree murder convictions.106 
B. RACE AND JUVENILE HOMICIDE RATES 
Researchers have observed that there are “highly disparate rates of 
imposing JLWOP on persons of color,” ranging from 68% to 88% of JLWOP 
sentences, and, astoundingly, 100% of those convicted in Texas when the 
penalty was available.107  In North Carolina, we observe that among the 
ninety-four individuals who were sentenced to JLWOP sentences, all but 
three are male.  8.5% (eight of ninety-four) are white; 81% (seventy-six of 
ninety-four) are black; 5% (five of ninety-four) are Latinx, 3% (three of 
ninety-four) are Asian; and 2% (two of ninety-four) are Native American.  
Thus, the vast majority, or 91.5% of those sentenced to JLWOP, are people 
of color or members of minority groups.  Of the forty-five defendants who 
 
 104 For an example of such a case, see William F. West, McDonald Pleads Guilty, Gets 
25–31 Years, DAILY ADVANCE, May 22, 2018, at http://www.dailyadvance.com/News/2018/
05/22/McDonald-pleads-guilty-gets-25-31-years.html [https://perma.cc/FCV2-X2RT]. 
 105 See infra Appendix A. 
 106 These data reflect information collected by North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services. 
 107 See MILLS ET AL., supra note 10, at 11 (“All of those serving JLWOP in Texas are 
persons of color. Other states also have highly disparate rates of imposing JLWOP on persons 
of color, including North Carolina (88% of the JLWOP population), Pennsylvania (80% of 
the JLWOP population), Louisiana (80% of the JLWOP population), Illinois (78% of the 
JLWOP population), Mississippi (68% of the JLWOP population), and South Carolina (68% 
of the JLWOP population).”). 
2020]  JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE IN NORTH CAROLINA 159 
have received sentences of less than LWOP post-Miller, three were white, 
one is Native American, three were Latinx, and two were Asian.  The other 
thirty-six were black.108 
These data reflect underlying racial demographics of homicides in 
North Carolina.  Since 1994, juvenile murders have generally declined 
nationwide.109  The FBI’s Supplemental Homicide Reports for the years 1994 
through 2016 describe demographics of juvenile homicide offenders, of 
which there were 925.110  Among those offenders, 217 were white, while 681 
were black (and twenty-one were Asian, Native American, or other—with 
the rest being unknown).111  The homicide commission rate by black 
juveniles in North Carolina from 1994 to 2016 was 74%.  The white juvenile 
homicide rate during that time period was 23%.  The FBI does not have a 
Latinx category for data reporting during that time period.112  The national 
data concerning juvenile murder offenders similarly disparate, with the 
disparity greatest in the 1990s, when almost twice as many juvenile murders 
were committed by black as opposed to white offenders.113 
C. COUNTY-LEVEL PATTERNS 
In the death penalty context, researchers have found stark differences in 
county-level patterns in sentencing, using nationwide data.  For example, 
researchers have found that the race of the victim was a strong predictor of 
death sentencing patterns.114  They have also found that there was a shift over 
time from rural to urban counties in death sentencing, for reasons that may 
include the cost of seeking death sentences and resources available for 
prosecution and defense in capital cases.115  While there is a large literature 
 
 108 See infra Appendix A. 
 109 Offending by Juveniles, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Supplementary Homicide 
Reports for the years 1980–2016, OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book (August 22, 2018). https://
www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/offenders/qa03101.asp?qaDate=2016 [https://perma.cc/MDK6-75D
B]. 
 110 OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, EASY ACCESS TO THE 
FBI’S SUPPLEMENTARY HOMICIDE REPORTS: 1980–2016, https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezas
hr/ [https://perma.cc/Q94W-3PX5]. 
 111 Federal Bureau of Investigation, OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book, Supplementary 
Homicide Reports for the years 1980–2016, https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/offenders/qa031
01.asp?qaDate=2016 (released on August 22, 2018) [https://perma.cc/MDK6-75DB]. 
 112 ERICA L. SMITH & ALEXIA COOPER, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, HOMICIDE IN THE 
U.S. KNOWN TO LAW ENFORCEMENT, 2011 16 (December 2013) (“Due to the lack of reporting 
of ethnicity by submitting law enforcement agencies, homicide rates by Hispanic or Latinx 
origin were not calculated.”). 
 113 Id. 
 114 Garrett et al., supra note 27, at 606. 
 115 Id. 
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on geographic disparities in death sentencing, no one has previously studied 
county-level patterns in the use of LWOP or JLWOP. 
We see a strong county-level concentration of JLWOP sentencing in 
North Carolina.  There are 100 counties in North Carolina.  Figure 2 displays 
the number of JLWOP sentences in North Carolina, by county, in the eleven 
counties with three or more such sentences.  A total of 61%, fifty-seven of 
the ninety-four LWOP sentences in North Carolina, were entered in these 11 
counties in North Carolina.  Just taking the five top counties—Cumberland, 
Wake, Mecklenburg, Guilford, and Forsyth—one sees thirty-eight sentences, 
40% of all JLWOP sentences, during that time period. 
 
Figure 2.  JLWOP Sentences in Top Counties, 1994–2018 
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The figures below show how some of these county-level patterns have 
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Figure 4.  North Carolina JLWOP Sentences by County, 2000–2009 
 
Figure 5.  North Carolina JLWOP Sentences by County, 1995–1999 
 
We conducted statistical testing to identify the contributing factors in 
juvenile JLWOP sentencing.  These tests were intended to identify possible 
variables that would increase or decrease the likelihood of a JLWOP sentence 
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being imposed on an individual defendant.  The JLWOP data was 
transformed into a county-year dyad format.  Since there are 100 counties in 
North Carolina and our JLWOP sentencing data covers twenty-four years 
(1995 to 2018), there are 2,400 observations.  Around 97% of the county-
year dyads report no observed JLWOP sentences.116  A Logit regression was 
used in order to understand how county-level effects correlate with the 
presence of a JLWOP sentence.  The dependent variable JLWOP Sentence 
was valued at one if there had been at least one JLWOP sentence in the given 
county and year.  A number of covariates were also included in the model.117 
The homicide rate, measured as the number of homicides per 100,000 in each 
county-year, was provided by the FBI’s Homicide Reports.118  The percent 
of the population in each county that is black was provided by the U.S. 
Census Bureau.119  The density of each county’s population was also 
provided by the Census Bureau.  Population density is measured as the 
number of people per square mile of land within a county.120  The poverty 
rate in each county was again provided by the Census Bureau and is defined 
as the percent of families in poverty.121  The results of the regression are 
displayed in Appendix C. 
 
 116 Negative Binomial regression models are typically used to model over-dispersed count 
outcomes. An alternative regression model for count dependent variables is derived from the 
Poisson distribution. A Poisson regression assumes there is no over-dispersion and the mean 
and standard deviation are equal. J. Scott Long, Regression Models for Categorical and 
Limited Dependent Variables, in 7 ADVANCED QUANTITATIVE TECH. IN THE SOC. SCI. 1 (1997). 
However, given the rarity of observing a JLWOP sentence, where the mean number of 
sentences is 0.04, and the standard deviation is 0.22, we decided that modeling the dependent 
variable, JLWOP Sentence, as a binary variable and applying Logistic regression was a more 
computationally sound approach. 
 117 Fixed effects for years and counties was also included in each model to control for 
unobserved and heterogenous relationships within the data. 
 118 See, e.g., Uniform Crime Reporting Program, Supplemental Homicide Reports Data: 
2014, NATIONAL ARCHIVE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA, https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrw
eb/NACJD/studies/36393/version/1 [https://perma.cc/EJ8R-GU9L]; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
INTERCENSAL ESTIMATES, http://www.census.gov/popest/data/ historical.index.html [https://
perma.cc/FDK4-E8CD]; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2016 FIPS CODES, https://www.census.gov/
geographies/reference-files/2016/demo/popest/2016-fips.html [https://perma.cc/FDK4-E8C
D]. 
 119 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COUNTY POPULATION TOTALS AND COMPONENTS OF CHANGE: 
2010–2018, https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/time-series/demo/popest/2010s-counties-
total.html [https://perma.cc/Z8Y4-995B]; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INTERCENSAL ESTIMATES, 
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/popest/data.html [https://perma.cc/2TL9-MKSN]. 
 120 See, e.g., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DENSITY USING LAND AREA FOR STATES, COUNTIES, 
METROPOLITAN AREAS, AND PLACES, https://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/de
nsity.html [https://perma.cc/7P5A-MYMA]. 
 121 In alternative specifications we included a count of previous death penalty sentences, 
a one-year lag of the homicide rate, and a one-year lag of the count of death penalty sentences. 
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The results of the regression suggest that the homicide rate and 
population density within a county do not have a statistically significant 
relationship with observing at least one JLWOP sentence.122  We also 
specified the homicide rate within the black population and the homicide rate 
in the white population for each county in separate models and again found 
no statistically significant results.  This suggests the homicide rate in a 
county, regardless of the victim’s race, does not correlate with the likelihood 
of observing a JLWOP sentence within the county. 
We found that the percent of the population in a county that is black and 
the poverty rate within a county do have statistically significant relationships 
with observing at least one JLWOP sentence.  For every 1% increase in the 
black population within a county, the odds of observing a JLWOP sentence 
(versus not observing a JLWOP sentence) increase by a factor of 1.036.  For 
every 1% increase in the poverty rate within a county, the odds of observing 
a JLWOP sentence (versus not observing a JLWOP sentence) decrease by a 
factor of 0.22. 
To summarize, the results of this analysis suggest that we are more 
likely to observe JLWOP sentences in North Carolina counties with a black 
population that is above average (20.9%) and in counties where the poverty 
rate is below average (16.1%).  This is highly consistent with recent patterns 
in death sentencing, in which counties with higher income, but also larger 
black populations, have imposed more death sentences.123  In contrast, the 
homicide rate and population density of these counties does not provide 
predictive information for observing a JLWOP sentence.124 
D. POST-MILLER REVERSALS 
As described, 48% (forty-five of ninety-four) JLWOP sentences in 
North Carolina have been reversed.  They have almost all been resentenced 
to life sentences with parole.  In addition, one of the ninety-four is currently 
pending a new trial.125  Although seven years have passed since the post-
 
 122 See infra Appendix, Section B for results with reported standard errors. 
 123 These finding are consistent with analyses of death sentencing, in which death 
sentences are more common in counties with a larger black population; in that context, 
however, death sentences were more common in counties with greater population density, and 
there was no statistically significant finding regarding income. See Garrett et al., supra note 
27, at 593–94. A study examining death sentences from 1982 through 1999 in five states found 
an association between death sentencing and lower-income counties. Theodore Eisenberg, 
Death Sentence Rates and County Demographics: An Empirical Study, 90 CORNELL L. 
REV. 347, 359 (2005). 
 124 These findings do not reflect the pattern seen in death sentencing regarding population 
density and homicide rates. See Garrett et al., supra note 27, at 593–94. 
 125 See Figure A. 
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Miller legislation was adopted in North Carolina, in many cases, as displayed 
in Figure A, hearings have not yet been held.  Thus, it is likely, given the 
outcomes to date, that far more JLWOP sentences will be reversed in the 
years to come.  The figure below displays the results in the forty-nine post-
Miller hearings so far held in North Carolina as well as cases in which no 
hearing has yet been held. 
 
Figure A.  Results in Post-Miller Hearings 
 
Figure B displays the current procedural posture of juvenile life without 
parole cases in North Carolina. Of the fifty-two cases requiring resolution, 
forty-six are still waiting for a hearing. Again, given the outcomes in the 
cases that have had hearings thus far, it is likely that many of the remaining 
JLWOP cases in North Carolina will result in reversals in the years to come. 
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Figure B.  Procedural Posture of North Carolina JLWOP Cases 
E. INERTIA EFFECT IN JLWOP SENTENCING 
In the empirical literature on death sentencing, researchers have 
identified an “inertia” or “muscle memory” effect; once a county starts using 
a sentence, it continues to do so more often.126  An inertia effect implies there 
is some kind of institutional memory.  A selection model was implemented 
across our county-year data in order to assess if there is an inertia effect for 
JLWOP sentences in North Carolina counties.127  Here, we observe the same 
county characteristics as before (i.e., poverty rate, population density, black 
 
 126 See GARRETT, supra note 12, at 149–50 (describing findings concerning county-level 
concentration and inertia for death sentences from 1990–2016); Lee Kovarsky, Muscle 
Memory and the Local Concentration of Capital Punishment, 66 DUKE L.J. 259 (2016) 
(describing increasing concentration of death sentences at the county-level); Garrett et al., 
supra note 27, at 567 (“[T]he entrenched practices or ‘muscle memory’ of a county matters a 
great deal in death sentencing. We found that across a range of measures, inertia in county 
death sentencing practices, or prior death sentences, is strongly associated with death 
sentencing.”). 
 127 The results of the first stage of the selection model are presented: the model utilized a 
Logistic regression. The second stage of the selection model has an outcome variable that is 
the count of JLWOP sentences observed. The results of the second stage are not shown, as 
they are not the focus of this subsection. 
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population share), and we also include a count of previous JLWOP sentences 
and a count of previous death penalty sentences.128  These regression results 
are displayed in Appendix C. 
The result of this regression indicates that as the number of past JLWOP 
sentences increases, the more likely we are to observe a county imposing a 
JLWOP sentence in subsequent cases.129  The results also suggest that as the 
number of prior death penalty sentences increases, the likelihood we observe 
a county applying a JLWOP sentence decreases; however, this is a very small 
effect.  For example, if there had been five previous death penalty sentences 
in a county, with all else being equal, the probability we observe a JLWOP 
sentence decreases by 1.8%. 
To fully interpret the results, the predicted probability of observing a 
county applying a JLWOP sentence is estimated while varying the number 
of previous JLWOP sentences (zero to seven).  All other variables in the 
model were held at their mean values.130  This estimation process suggests 
the following: when there has never been a JLWOP sentence in a county, 
there is a 55.9% probability of observing a JLWOP sentence.  However, 
when there have been two prior JLWOP sentences, this probability rises to 
62.1%. When there have been seven prior JLWOP sentences, the probability 
of observing a JLWOP sentence in this county rises to 72.7%. 
These results suggest that inertia matters more than homicide rates.  The 
results imply that a county’s prior use of JLWOP is far more predictive of 
JLWOP sentencing than a county’s crime rates.  Regardless of whether we 
study homicide rates per 100,000 in each county-year, homicides rates within 
the black population of each county, or homicide rates within the white 
population, the homicide rate does not have a statistically significant 
correlation with use of JLWOP.  In sum, once a county has used a JLWOP 
sentence, that county has a higher probability of using a JLWOP sentence 
again in the future.  Institutional inertia appears to be a source of the 
sentences, possibly due to preferences of prosecutors, law enforcement, or 
receptivity of jurors to such sentences, driving the initial JLWOP sentencing 
decisions.131 
 
 128 Once again, fixed effects for year and counties were included in the regression. 
 129 Please refer to Appendix C for results with reported standard errors. 
 130 The county fixed effect was set to Wake County and the year fixed effect was set to 
2016. 
 131 See Garrett et al., supra note 27, at 600 (“This path dependency may reflect practices 
of prosecutors who make the charging decisions whether to seek the death penalty, but it may 
also capture defense lawyering, judges, jurors, and other features of a county that make it more 
likely to continue to death sentence over time.”). 
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There is anecdotal evidence supporting this finding of an inertia effect.  
In North Carolina, prosecutor’s offices have taken policy positions on 
seeking JLWOP.  For example, the former Mecklenberg District Attorney 
sought LWOP in every single one of the JLWOP cases that were eligible for 
re-sentencing post-Miller, suggesting a blanket policy towards JLWOP.132  If 
so, then this is another important area in criminal justice in which local-level 
decision-making, which may not be formal or stated in policy or public 
statements, affects serious sentencing decisions more so than crime rates or 
other factors.  Future research should examine this phenomenon in other 
states and for other sentences. 
III. COST AND IMPLICATIONS OF MAINTAINING JLWOP IN NORTH 
CAROLINA 
A. COSTS OF JLWOP 
We have described a process in which JLWOP sentences were used 
primarily in a small set of counties in the 1990s, before fading in their 
imposition.  During the post-Miller period, 40% were reversed, and hearings 
are pending in most of the remaining cases.  These findings raise the question 
of what the cost is of retaining JLWOP going forward, given its rare 
imposition since 2011 and the large number of resource-intensive hearings 
that must still be conducted.  What is the cost to the court system, defense 
attorneys, and prosecutors of conducting the review of JLWOP cases?  These 
Miller hearings are expensive due to the retrospective focus on mitigation 
evidence, including the entire social and medical history of the defendant, 
and the accompanying need to retain, on both sides, a range of experts.133  
Hearings will then produce appeals, and sometimes the result will be re-
hearings. 
Little is known about the full set of expenses associated with that 
process, but some estimates are available.  In Louisiana, one estimate posited 
that defense costs for hearings could run $50,000 to $70,000 per case.134  That 
 
 132 Herbert L. White, Throw Away the Key: Kid Killers, Restorative Justice and the Law, 
CHARLOTTE POST (Oct. 17, 2018, 11:37 AM), http://www.thecharlottepost.com/news/2018/
10/17/local-state/throw-away-the-key-kid-killers-restorative-justice-and-the-law/ [https://per
ma.cc/2KBS-AYRF]. 
 133 For an overview, see Antoinette Kavanaugh & Thomas Grisso, Prospects for 
Development of Expert Evidence in Juvenile “Montgomery” Resentencing Cases, 22 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 235 (2016). 
 134 Bryn Stole, With New Law on the Books, Louisiana Courts Prepare to Re-Sentence 
Hundreds of Juvenile Murderers, THE ADVOCATE (July 23, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.the
advocate.com/baton_rouge/news/courts/article_dc5ae4c2-6f28-11e7-9633-2bee1fbaf113.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/WT3K-XNPR]. 
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estimate may be a real understatement.  The defense must look to the type of 
mitigation obligations applicable to counsel in death penalty cases.  Trial 
guidelines include litigation teams with qualified defense counsel, an 
investigator, a mitigation specialist, and, if appropriate, an interpreter.135  The 
defense must interview people who have known the defendant for the 
person’s entire life, including family members, teachers, prison staff, 
probation officers, counselors, doctors, neighbors, co-workers, friends, and 
mental health professionals.136  Records from the relevant agencies must be 
collected, including from schools, work, foster care, mental health care, 
hospitalization, prison records, and more.137  Expert psychological and 
psychiatric evaluations may need to be done, as well as—where applicable—
assessments regarding child trauma, sexual and physical abuse, neurological 
development, substance abuse, traumatic brain injury, and other 
conditions.138  In death penalty cases, those costs can run into the hundreds 
of thousands of dollars, and even the millions.139  The cost of incarceration 
for life is far larger.  A fifty-year sentence for a sixteen-year-old has been 
estimated, based on national average costs, as costing approximately $2.25 
million.140 
North Carolina legislation introduced in 2019, which would replace 
JLWOP with life with parole sentences and parole eligibility after twenty-
five years for first degree murder convictions, and parole eligibility after 
fifteen years for persons convicted of other offenses and sentenced to more 
than fifteen years, has been accompanied by cost estimates concerning its 
adoption.141 
Authors of this article, in a fiscal impact letter regarding the legislation, 
noted that the legislation results in earlier parole eligibility for eighty-seven 
prisoners who were under eighteen at the time they committed crimes leading 
 
 135 See Trial Defense Guidelines: Representing Child Client Facing Possible Life 
Sentence, CAMPAIGN FOR FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH (2015), http://fairsentencingofyouth.
org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Trial-Defense-Guidelines- Representing-a-Child-Client-Fac
ing-a-Possible-Life-Sentence.pdf [https://perma.cc/UYE5-R4LJ]. 
 136 For an overview of mitigation work in capital cases, see GARRETT, supra note 12, at 
127–30; regarding the obligation to conduct such work in capital cases, see id. at 71. 
 137 Id. at 57. 
 138 Id. at 22–23. 
 139 For an overview of studies on cost in the death penalty context, see Death Penalty 
Information Center, State and Federal Cost Studies, at https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/costs-deat
h-penalty [https://perma.cc/CY7B-FD6N]. 
 140 ROVNER, supra note 5, at 1. 
 141 H.B. 775, Gen. Assemb., 2019 Sess. (N.C. 2019), available at https://www.ncleg.
gov/Sessions/2019/Bills/House/PDF/H775v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9RJ-NY5H]. 
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to their life sentences.142  Those prisoners are currently either ineligible for 
parole or will not become eligible for more than twenty-five years.  Suppose 
these prisoners were fairly promptly released on parole (to be sure, we do not 
know how quickly they would be granted parole, should the new legislation 
be adopted).  The cost of five years of parole is as follows: the North Carolina 
Department of Public Safety estimates that supervising one inmate on parole 
for one year costs the state $1,938, based on the fiscal year ending June 30, 
2017.143  Thus, it would cost approximately $10,000 per inmate for the five 
years of parole supervision (and perhaps more if there are infractions or 
additional treatment and services).  We noted that the cost to house one 
inmate for one year, based on the fiscal year ending June 30, 2018, is an 
average of $36,219.144  We estimated, at a conservative inflation rate of 2%, 
that in fifty years the annual cost to house an inmate will be $95,575.145  In 
North Carolina, the average life expectancy is seventy-eight years.146  The 
eighty-seven inmates affected by this litigation are, on average, thirty-six 
years old and will spend at least 2,280 more years in prison combined.147  The 
minimum cost to house these eighty-seven prisoners until death or their 
earliest parole release will be approximately $163.6 million.148  If these 
prisoners earned parole release under the new legislation, they would serve 
624 more years combined.  The cost of their incarceration would be only 
$34.7 million, with a potential savings to North Carolina of $129 million.149 
We noted that this cost estimate does not include the cost of 
incarcerating any juveniles that would be sentenced to LWOP in the future, 
absent this statutory change, nor cost savings for changes to non-first-degree-
homicide sentences or Fair Sentencing Act sentences to juveniles.150  Further, 
costs of incarceration continue to rise.  In Massachusetts, for example, costs 
increased by almost 16% from 2010 to 2014.151  Nor does that cost estimate 
 
 142 Brandon L. Garrett, Fiscal Impact Summary: House Bill 775, May 22, 2019 (on file 
with authors). 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Ames Alexander, Study: Where you Grow Up in North Carolina Affects Your Life 
Span, THE CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, May 26, 2015, https://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/
local/article22193088.html [https://perma.cc/N6LE-CMS4]. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Margaret E. Leigey & Doris Schartmueller, The Fiscal and Human Costs of Life 
Without Parole, 99 PRISON J. 241, 247 (2019). 
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include the cost of litigating JLWOP challenges in hearings that will occur if 
this legislation is not enacted. 
These findings suggest the post-Miller legislation may have provided 
an expensive and time-consuming way to re-assess JLWOP sentences.  It 
would certainly be more cost-effective and direct to eliminate JLWOP 
entirely rather than incur costs for a prolonged review process.  And it must 
be acknowledged that in many cases the practical difference, in terms of years 
served, may not be great if juvenile convicts are repeatedly denied parole. 
B. LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY CHANGES TO JLWOP 
Many states have reconsidered JLWOP post-Miller, with some states 
abolishing the practice in recent years, others creating periodic review of 
such sentences, and others adopting discretionary standards like in North 
Carolina.152  As of February 2019, twenty-three states have through 
legislation removed JLWOP, including twelve states that have enacted 
legislation in the past decade; additional states ban such sentences in most, 
but not all, cases.153  Several other states have legislation pending or have 
recently introduced such legislation, including: Arizona, Illinois, New Jersey, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.154  Nevertheless, 
some states that do not permit JLWOP sentences still permit aggregation of 
consecutive sentences that create functional life without parole sentences.155  
The North Carolina legislation introduced in 2019 would replace JLWOP 
with life with parole sentences and parole eligibility after twenty-five years 
for first degree murder convictions, and parole eligibility after fifteen years 
for persons convicted of other offenses and sentenced to more than fifteen 
years.156 
 
 152 For a detailed survey, see Associated Press, A State-by-state Look at Juvenile Life 
Without Parole, July 30, 2017, https://apnews.com/9debc3bdc7034ad2a68e62911fba0d85/A-
state-by-state-look-at-juvenile-life-without-parole [https://perma.cc/9SQV-T68M]. 
 153 For a complete list, see States That Ban Life Without Parole for Children, Campaign 
for the Fair Sentencing of Youth (2018) (Oregon recently enacted law banning JLWOP 
bringing the number of states banning JLWOP to 23), https://www.fairsentencingofyouth.or
g/media-resources/states-that-ban-life/ [https://perma.cc/64AJ-8EDZ]. 
 154 See H.B. 2193, 53d Leg., 2d. Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2018); S.B. 3228, 100th Gen. Assemb. 
(Ill 2018); Leg. B. 875, 105th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2018); Assemb. B. 1233, 218th Leg. (N.J. 
2018); H.B. 775, Gen. Assemb., 2019 Sess. (N.C. 2019); S.B. 112, 57th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 
2019); H.B. 3919, 123d Sess. (S.C. 2019); H.B. 0852, Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2019); S.B. 890, 
Gen. Assemb., 2018 Sess. (Va. 2018). 
 155 ROVNER, supra note 5, at 1; see also Doriane Lambelet Coleman & James E. Coleman, 
Jr., Getting Juvenile Life Without Parole “Right” After Miller v. Alabama, 8 DUKE J. CONST. 
L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68–69 (2012). 
 156 H.B. 775, Gen. Assemb., 2019 Sess. (N.C. 2019), available at https://www.ncleg.gov/
Sessions/2019/Bills/House/PDF/H775v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/H65M-ZR5C]. 
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Any statutory scheme replacing JLWOP should offer an ongoing, 
meaningful opportunity for review, so that it does not result in “virtual 
LWOP” for juvenile offenders—in which a formal opportunity for release 
exists on paper but is extremely unlikely in practicality.  One model is the 
Fair Sentencing for Youth legislation enacted in California, which permits 
all juvenile offenders, whether convicted of a homicide or not, to obtain 
review after a time period between fifteen and twenty-five years.157  Another 
model is the legislation enacted in Wyoming which creates eligibility for 
commutation after twenty-five years.158  Virginia recently adopted legislation 
creating eligibility for parole at twenty years, for juveniles who had been 
sentenced to LWOP or any sentence longer than twenty years. 159  Such 
approaches have the benefit that they apply consistently to all juvenile 
sentencing.  They eliminate the sentencing disparity often seen between those 
sentenced to concurrent or consecutive terms. 
Any such change to provide for parole eligibility must also be 
accompanied by criteria to govern the review process, so that the review 
satisfies U.S. Supreme Court rulings regarding meaningful opportunity for 
review, and so that the process is in fact a meaningful consideration of the 
merits of each case.  Thus, “[e]liminating juvenile life without parole does 
not suggest guaranteed release of these offenders,” as the Sentencing Project 
has put it.160  “Rather, it would provide that an opportunity for review be 
granted after a reasonable period of incarceration, one that takes into 
consideration the unique circumstances of each defendant.”161 
The overall goal of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence in this area is to offer “the juvenile offender a chance to 
demonstrate growth and maturity.”162  Whether LWOP sentences for 
juveniles are eliminated, or recurring review is structured in legislation, 
 
 157 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d)(2)(A)(i); see also id. at (d)(2)(h) (permitting 
subsequent parole review after serving twenty, twenty-four and twenty-five years of an LWOP 
sentence). 
 158 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-10-301(c) (2013) (“A person sentenced to life imprisonment for 
an offense committed before the person reached the age of eighteen (18) years shall be eligible 
for parole after commutation of his sentence to a term of years or after having served twenty-
five (25) years of incarceration”). 
 159 VA CODE § 53.1-165.1 (“any person sentenced to a term of life imprisonment for a 
single felony or multiple felonies committed while the person was a juvenile and who has 
served at least 20 years of such sentence shall be eligible for parole and any person who has 
active sentences that total more than 20 years for a single felony or multiple felonies 
committed while the person was a juvenile and who has served at least 20 years of such 
sentences shall be eligible for parole.”). 
 160 ROVNER, supra note 5, at 4. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. at 73. 
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legislation should aim to guarantee such meaningful opportunities for review 
after reasonable amounts of time, because juvenile offenders have 
“diminished moral responsibility” and may also have more rehabilitative 
potential, as “incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.”163 
Alternatively, prosecutors could litigate juvenile sentences very 
differently, without a legislative change.  Such an across-the-board defense 
of JLWOP sentences does not reflect the law; the U.S. Supreme Court and 
North Carolina courts have been clear that such sentences should be reserved 
for unusual cases.  Instead, prosecutors could themselves more rigorously 
consider the factors relevant to whether a JLWOP sentence is appropriate 
internally. 
If the prosecutors in the small set of counties responsible for most of 
these sentences changed their approach towards defending JLWOP 
sentences, costly litigation could be avoided.  Earlier parole eligibility could 
result from a more reasonable and consistent litigation posture among 
prosecutor’s offices.  There is no reason that there should, for example, be 
lengthy consecutive sentences imposed, extending the amount of time 
juveniles must wait until there is a possibility of parole.  This problem could 
be addressed at the local level by changes in prosecution policy.  In the past, 
these cases have been litigated by prosecutors, over many years, even in cases 
like felony murder cases in which defendants most clearly deserve and 
typically obtain relief from JLWOP sentences.  Local election of prosecutors 
permits each district to adopt its own policies and approaches towards 
prosecution, but that localism also permits counties to impose real costs, in 
the form of extremely lengthy sentences, on the state.  A discussion of the 
costs JLWOP impose is particularly ripe, as states increasingly reconsider 
permitting such sentences. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we examine JLWOP sentencing in North Carolina.  We 
describe the population of ninety-four persons in North Carolina, who were 
sentenced to LWOP as juveniles.  Of those, forty-eight remain sentenced to 
LWOP and forty-five have so far been resentenced to non-LWOP sentences, 
largely pursuant to the post-Miller legislation in North Carolina.  We describe 
how JLWOP sentencing has declined since its late 1990s height in North 
Carolina.  Beginning in 2011, there have been either one or no such sentences 
each year.  We describe how these LWOP sentences are highly concentrated 
in a handful of counties.  We statistically demonstrate the presence of a strong 
 
 163 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72–73 (2010) (quoting Workman v. Commonwealth, 
429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. App. 1968)). 
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inertia effect, in which prior JLWOP sentences are strongly correlated with 
the imposition of JLWOP in counties.  These analyses suggest that factors 
relating to past practices and local preferences influence JLWOP sentencing. 
Finally, we explore the procedural posture of this cohort of cases, 
focusing on the post-Miller review of these sentences.  As we detail, forty-
five prisoners have so far been resentenced—but most of the remainder have 
not yet had Miller hearings.  There will be at least forty-two additional 
resentencing hearings in the years to come.  This means there will be 
substantial additional costs in litigating JLWOP sentences that are likely to 
be largely overturned.  Over almost two and a half decades, half of these 
sentences have been vacated, at great cost, after multiple rounds of appeals 
and hearings—all for a penalty that has been almost entirely discontinued.  
Indeed, the penalty is now barred in the cases of one-third of this group, who 
were sentenced under felony murder theories. 
In a time in which JLWOP sentences are not permitted in any other 
country in the world, and in which JLWOP sentencing has greatly declined 
in the U.S., it is time to reconsider the use of JLWOP where it remains, as 
many states have already done.  In North Carolina, prior sentences are being 
reversed at a high rate, and the use of such sentences does not appear fair, 
warranted, or consistent.  These findings provide an empirical case for 
reconsidering the use of JLWOP in North Carolina.  Rather than impose rigid 
sentences on juveniles, which Eighth Amendment rulings have already called 
into question, alternatives that rely on periodic review of lengthy juvenile 
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APPENDIX A: JLWOP SENTENCES IN NORTH CAROLINA164 
 
Last Name First Name 
Gender 
Race/Ethnicity 









Ames Kamani M Black 17 9/27/15 1/19/18 Camden LWOP 
Anderson Darrell M Black 17 12/3/02 8/4/03 Davidson Life With 
x2 
Andrade Jesus M Latinx 17 8/12/05 1/11/07 Forsyth Life With 
Antone Marquice M Black 16 4/13/12 3/25/14 Columbus Life With 
Ash Antwan M Black 16 10/28/05 6/15/07 Brunswick Life With 
Ash Lawrence M Black 17 6/26/00 11/17/03 Cumberland Life With 
+ 29-44 
Banner Rayshawn M Black 14 11/15/02 8/19/04 Forsyth Life With 
Bass Lamar M Black 17 12/26/05 1/25/07 Durham LWOP 
Beck Johnny M Black 16 2/25/95 9/8/95 Wake LWOP 
Bellamy Lakeith M Black 15 7/15/98 4/5/99 Lee Life With 
Blair Cameron M Black 16 10/9/03 6/14/05 Mecklenburg Life With 
+ 8-10 
Brockett Jacobie M Black 16 3/6/05 10/31/05 Pitt LWOP 
Canady Joseph M Black 17 8/22/97 5/4/99 Wilson Life With 
Cash Nelson M Black 16 5/16/97 3/11/98 Rutherford Life With 
+ 25-39 
Cauthen Nathaniel M Black 15 11/15/02 8/19/04 Forsyth Life With 
Chapman Lamorris M Black 17 7/9/00 10/29/01 Johnston Life With 
Clodfelter Dwight M White 17 9/27/05 9/15/08 Forsyth LWOP 
Cofield Demetrius M Black 17 11/6/95 10/11/96 Edgecombe Life With 
Dickerson Jerome M Black 17 7/19/03 7/27/06 Forsyth LWOP 
Douglas Tameika F Black 15 8/17/98 9/7/00 Cumberland LWOP 
Dudley Michael M Black 16 12/7/99 11/30/00 Guilford Life With 
Golphin Kevin M Black 17 9/23/97 5/13/98 Cumberland LWOP 
 
 164 These names and sentences were generated analyzing data from the North Carolina 
Department of Public Safety available at http://www.doc.state.nc.us/offenders/INMT4AA1.
zip [https://perma.cc/286Q-BKKZ] and http://www.doc.state.nc.us/offenders/OFNT3CE1.zip 
(on file with author and Journal). 
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Grady Lakendra F Black 17 1/23/06 7/17/06 New 
Hanover 
Life With 
Green Dustin M White 16 11/14/97 10/12/98 Rutherford LWOP 
Gregory Joseph M Black 17 3/5/08 4/28/09 New 
Hanover 
Life With 
Hare Ryan M White 17 11/30/08 9/24/10 Wake LWOP 
High Nathanael M White 15 2/10/02 5/24/04 Gaston Term Of 
Years 
Hinnant Danny M Black 17 1/4/10 1/19/11 Wilson LWOP 
Ingram Ellsworth M Black 15 7/3/97 9/21/98 Montgomery LWOP 
Jackson Willie M Black 15 5/24/01 10/24/02 Northampton Life With 
+ 25-39 
Jacobs Christopher M Indian 16 12/15/95 1/15/99 Scotland LWOP 
James Harry M Black 16 5/12/06 6/10/10 Mecklenburg Life With 
James Terrance M Black 17 6/29/97 6/30/99 Cleveland LWOP 
Jefferson Delmonte M Black 17 2/20/01 4/18/02 Johnston LWOP 
Jefferson Shymel M Black 15 11/7/09 6/8/12 Rockingham Term of 
Years 
Johnson Tydis M Black 15 8/23/96 5/21/97 Cleveland Life With 
Johnston Donovan M Black 16 5/11/95 4/17/96 Mecklenburg Life With 
Jones Harold M Black 16 10/16/98 10/5/00 Cumberland LWOP 
Jones Joseph M Black 13 10/16/98 2/23/00 Cumberland LWOP 
Keaton Akeem M Black 16 1/29/05 2/13/08 Mecklenburg LWOP 
Kelliher James M White 17 8/7/01 3/1/04 Cumberland Life With 
x2 
Kornegay Eric M Black 17 8/28/99 8/31/00 Lenoir LWOP 
Lee Kentay M Black 14 1/1/99 7/7/00 Mecklenburg Term of 
years 
Lesane George M Black 17 12/1/94 2/4/98 Robeson LWOP 
Lewis Danny M Indian 17 9/2/02 7/6/04 Robeson Life With 
Lovette Laurence M Black 17 3/5/08 12/20/11 Orange LWOP 
Lowery Jamie M Black 16 7/2/08 2/9/11 Robeson Life With 
May Jahrheel M Black 16 1/2/13 7/16/15 Pitt Life With 
+ 64-89 
Mayhand Anthony M Black 16 11/19/95 11/7/96 Guilford LWOP 
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McCord Travis M Black 16 2/10/97 4/7/99 Cleveland LWOP 
McKeithan Henry M Black 17 6/12/97 8/26/98 Harnett LWOP 
McKinney Antonio M Black 16 7/30/99 1/18/01 Wayne LWOP 
McLaughlin Jamison M Black 17 7/18/95 9/25/97 Cumberland Life With 
McLean Dwight M Black 17 11/1/02 10/18/04 Wake LWOP 
McPhatter Marcus M Black 16 12/15/95 11/20/98 Scotland Life With 
McRae Derrick M Black 16 10/14/95 5/14/98 Richmond Life With 
Medina Jhalmar M Latinx 16 3/10/03 9/1/04 Mecklenburg Life With 
+ 189-236 
Meeks Kenneth M Black 16 6/28/04 4/10/06 Wilson LWOP 
Morris Cameron M Black 17 4/28/05 1/24/07 Wake Life With 
Moss Decarlos M Black 17 4/25/02 5/28/04 Person Life With 
Nguyen Doan M Asian 17 6/17/02 10/3/03 Cumberland Life With 
Oglesby Jaamall M Black 16 9/10/02 5/28/04 Forsyth LWOP 
Pallas Peter M White 16 10/20/97 9/2/99 New 
Hanover 
LWOP 
Pemberon Devonte M Black 17 5/9/10 10/4/11 Wake Term Of 
Years 
Perkins Artis M Black 15 9/16/00 4/20/01 Wake LWOP 
Perry Antonio M Black 17 9/10/03 8/25/04 Nash Life With 
x2 + 157-
198 
Perry Dominique M Black 17 4/18/07 8/27/08 Guilford LWOP 
Purcell Keonte M Black 17 5/6/07 12/17/09 Cumberland Life With 
+ 16-20 




Santiago Donte M Black 16 7/31/01 4/17/03 Onslow Life With 
+ 114-164 
Santillan Jonathan M Latinx 15 1/5/13 9/1/15 Wake LWOP 
Seam Sethy M Asian 16 11/19/97 9/30/99 Davidson Life With 
Simmons Gregory M Black 17 5/27/06 4/23/08 Brunswick LWOP 
Sims Antwaun M Black 17 1/4/00 8/24/01 Onslow LWOP 
Stancil Wayne M White 17 7/7/98 8/2/99 Carteret LWOP 
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Stinnett Carlos M Black 15 11/20/95 11/1/96 Johnston LWOP 
Sturdivant Sandy M Black 16 6/13/98 12/2/99 Union Life With 
Sullivan Michael M Black 16 6/5/02 10/25/04 Durham Life With 
Swain Leo M Black 16 6/2/99 10/30/00 Buncombe Life With 
Taylor Matthew M Black 16 2/17/04 7/20/05 Durham LWOP 
Thornton Matthew M Black 15 12/4/06 1/13/09 Harnett LWOP 
Tirado Francisco M Latinx 17 8/17/98 4/11/00 Cumberland LWOP 
Tomlin Frank M Black 16 6/25/03 5/19/05 Guilford LWOP 
Valdez Eric M Latinx 17 3/14/05 10/5/06 McDowell LWOP 
Walker William M White 17 7/26/97 4/9/98 Stokes LWOP 
Walters Travis M Black 17 1/6/98 9/25/09 Robeson Life With 
Watson Steven M Black 17 7/15/97 4/16/99 Guilford LWOP 
Williams Montrez M Black 17 6/30/08 6/15/11 Mecklenburg Life With 
x2 
Williams Raytheon M Black 17 11/25/06 11/20/09 Guilford LWOP 
Willis Anthony M Black 16 2/16/96 12/10/97 Cumberland Life With 
+ 25-39 
Wooten Kolanda F Black 17 8/24/03 4/19/05 Wayne LWOP 
Xanonh Ang M Asian 14 10/29/94 8/25/95 Wake LWOP 
Yarrell Rashawn M Black 17 9/17/00 12/10/02 Randolph LWOP 
Young David M Black 17 1/8/97 5/4/99 Buncombe LWOP 
 












178 FINHOLT, GARRETT, MODJADIDI, & RENBERG [Vol. 110 






















       0.035** 
(0.015) 














    -0.000 
(0.000) 
Poverty Rate       -0.120*** 
(0.044) 
     -0.109** 
(0.044) 
    -0.116*** 
(0.043) 

















   -0.042 
(0.258) 
Intercept      -2.407*** 
(0.659) 
      -2.513*** 
(0.650) 
     -2.356*** 
(0.622) 
     -2.297*** 
(0.671) 
Observations 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400 
County Fixed-
Effects 
YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed-
Effects 
YES YES YES YES 
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Population Density       -0.0002*** 
(0.000) 
     -0.0001*** 
(0.000) 




# of Previous JWOP 
Sentence(s) 
       0.101*** 
(0.012) 
 
# of DP Sentence(s)       -0.019*** 
(0.006) 
 
Any Prior JLWOP 
Sentence (binary) 
        0.213*** 
(0.023) 
Any Prior DP Sentence 
(binary) 
  0.001 
(0.023) 




Observations 2,400 2,400 
County Fixed-Effects YES YES 
Year Fixed-Effects YES YES 
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.001; Death penalty is abbreviated as “DP”. 
 
